Mail Archives: cygwin/2026/10/06/08:34:12
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| To: | <cygwin AT cygwin DOT com>
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| In-Reply-To: | <9392212be89f81f2@cvs.openbsd.org>
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| Subject: | RE: Announce: OpenSSH 10.6 released
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| Date: | Tue, 6 Oct 2026 08:33:28 -0400
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| Organization: | PD Inc
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| From: | Jason Pyeron via Cygwin <cygwin AT cygwin DOT com>
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| Reply-To: | cygwin AT cygwin DOT com
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| Cc: | Jason Pyeron <jpyeron AT pdinc DOT us>
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| Sender: | "Cygwin" <cygwin-bounces~archive-cygwin=delorie DOT com AT cygwin DOT com>
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I have uploaded this as a test-package.
Please test and let me know of bugs or successes.
v/r,
Jason
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Damien Miller
> Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2026 8:11 AM
> To: openssh-unix-dev AT mindrot DOT org
> Subject: Announce: OpenSSH 10.6 released
>
> OpenSSH 10.6 has just been released. It will be available from the
> mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
>
> OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
> includes sftp client and server support.
>
> Recently the OpenSSH team have received a large number of security
> bug reports, many of which are findings from AI models or made with
> AI assistance. While many AI reports are determined not to have
> security impact when considered in the context of a realistic
> threat model, we very much welcome these reports, especially when
> combined with human triage, analysis, test-cases and particularly
> when accompanied by proposed fixes.
>
> ** We have seen a number of cases where a security bug identified
> ** by AI tools is subsequently independently discovered by a
> ** different researcher. This suggests that adversaries who do not
> ** report bugs to OSS projects are likely to be able to discover
> ** these bugs too. Given this, the OpenSSH team will, for now, be
> ** making more frequent releases to get bugfixes into users' hands
> ** more quickly rather than batching them until the next planned
> ** release.
>
> Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
> continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
> code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
> project. More information on donations may be found at:
> https://www.openssh.com/donations.html
>
> Future deprecation notice
> -------------------------
>
> * scp(1): begin deprecating the -R flag, which is used to perform a
> remote-to-remote copy by executing scp on a remote host. This
> option is a fragile optimisation that is difficult to use because
> it requires credentials on the remote host. It also creates
> security risks if the shell quoting rules on the remote system
> where the copy is performed differ from the client's expectations.
>
> From OpenSSH 10.6, this option will continue to work but will
> cause a deprecation warning to be emitted to standard error. In
> a future release, the option will be ignored and will leave in
> place the default remote-to-remote copy behaviour (copy via the
> host running scp).
>
> * sshd(8): support for platforms that do not allow file descriptor
> passing and that also require root privilege for PTY allocation
> will be removed in a future release. Affected platforms are known
> to include SCO OpenServer 5 and QNX 6 but may include other
> similarly old operating systems. This deprecation can be avoided
> if the user community for these platforms is able to assist us in
> building alternatives, such as avoiding the need for root in PTY
> allocation.
>
> Potentially-incompatible changes
> --------------------------------
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): compression will be less effective as a result
> of the change noted below in the "Security" section
>
> * ssh(1): destination usernames entered on the commandline are now
> more stricly checked and will refuse usernames that include
> backslash and dollar symbols. Usernames that are specified by
> the "User" directive in configuration files are no subject to
> these restrictions. This motivation for this change is mentioned
> below in the "Security" section.
>
> * sshd(8): on platforms that do not support file descriptor passing
> and that require root for PTY allocation, the GatewayPorts and
> StreamLocalForwarding options are forcibly disabled. The
> motivation for this changes is discussed below in the "Security"
> section.
>
> Changes since OpenSSH 10.5
> ==========================
>
> This release contains a number of security fixes, several new
> features and some small bugfixes.
>
> Security
> ========
>
> * sftp(1): more strictly validate paths returned from the server to
> avoid some cases where a server could return paths that could
> manipulate a recursive copy operation into writing outside its
> target directory. Report and patch from Junghoon Cho.
>
> * sshd(8): when GSSAPIAuthentication is in use, only store GSSAPI
> credentials when authentication has succeeded. Avoids a situation
> where credentials from a failed GSSAPIAuthentication attempt may
> persist and be made inappropriately available if another
> authentication subsequently succeeds. Issue report and patch from
> Moritz Theile.
>
> * sshd(8): reset GSSAPIAuthentication before authentication, avoiding
> state from one authentication attempt being confused with that of
> a later attempt. Report and feedback from Moritz Theile.
>
> * sshd(8), ssh(1): disable LZ77 dictionary coder to mitigate the
> side-channel leaks described in "Crossing the Streams: SSH
> Plaintext Recovery via a Common Compression Context in
> Multiplexed Channels" by Fabian BC$umer and Marcus Brinkmann,
> preprint https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07709 (2026)
>
> A chosen-plaintext attack method exists which makes use of
> dictionary-based compression to recover secrets from one channel
> by interacting with the SSH session's shared compression
> dictionary through another channel.
>
> Attacker-controlled input can recognizably reflect into the
> total length of transmitted ciphertexts by virtue of LZ77
> replacing repeated strings with back-references into the SSH
> session's encoder search buffer, which is shared across all
> channels. For this reason, the documentation already recommended
> against enabling compression for connections that share trusted
> and untrusted traffic.
>
> This change will reduce the effectiveness of the Compression
> option. Users are encouraged to use application-level compression
> over the SSH protocol where possible, as this will typically be
> more effective and will be completely immune to this type of
> attack.
>
> * ssh(1): disallow '$' and '\' characters in usernames entered on
> the command-line to avoid usernames from untrusted sources
> yielding injection in shell context via ProxyCommand, Match exec,
> etc. Usernames specified via the configuration files are not
> subject this this control. Reported by SecBuddyF KeenLab Tencent
> (CodeBuddy Security)
>
> We continue to recommend against directly exposing ssh(1) and
> other tools' command-lines to untrusted input. Mitigations such
> as this can not be absolute given the variety of shells and user
> configurations in use.
>
> * ssh-keygen(1): correct handling of Daylight Saving Time when
> converting dates. Previous handling could cause errors of
> up to +/- 1 hour (unless you are in the Antarctica/Troll
> timezone, where the error could be +/- 2 hours). These errors
> could result in creation of certificates with incorrect expiry
> times. bz4004; from Khush Patel
>
> * sshd(8), ssh(1): ensure that compressed payloads don't inflate
> past the maximum supported packet length. Reported by Oleh Konko.
>
> * sshd(8): fully honor the authorized_keys "restrict" keyword,
> which was not being properly applied to tunnel forwarding
> (PermitTunnel, disabled by default). This is a separate problem
> to the one fixed in openssh-10.5.
>
> * sshd(8): correctly handle some options that accept "none". Some
> options, including AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, were documented as
> accepting "none" as a way to disable them; however, when
> overridden by an sshd_config(5) Match keyword, this argument was
> being incorrectly interpreted as a literal file.
> With Chris Rohlf in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research
>
> * sshd(8): On OS X SDK >= 27, sandboxing is no longer supported
> as the API we depended upon has been removed and no obvious
> alternative provided.
>
> * sshd(8): on platforms that do not support file descriptor passing
> and that require root for PTY allocation, the post-authentication
> sshd-session process retains root privilege, whereas on other
> platforms this process runs with the privilege of the logged-in
> user. When sshd-session was run with elevated privlege, it could
> perform certain actions as root and circumvent controls that
> would normally have applied to the user, such as making unix
> domain socket connections or binding (via -R forwarding) to low-
> numbered TCP ports.
>
> For this reason, this release disables the GatewayPorts and
> StreamLocalForwarding options and support for these (few)
> platforms will be removed in future if no alteratives to
> requiring privilege in the post-authentication process are found.
> Affected platforms include QNX 6, SCO OpenServer 5 and builds
> that were made with the --disable-fd-passing configure option.
>
> This problem was reported separately by sn0x-sharma and by Dark
> River.
>
> New features
> ------------
>
> * All: enable hybrid post-quantum ssh-mldsa44-ed25519 signature
> algorithm. Note that this no longer uses the "@openssh.com"
> vendor extension suffix that the previous experimental
> implementation used. Keys generated with the previous experimental
> support must be regenerated and/or removed.
>
> * sshd(8): Add the WarnWeakCrypto option to sshd_config(5). This
> option was previously available for the client only. This option
> is enabled by default and will log when the client uses a key
> agreement scheme that is not post-quantum safe.
>
> * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): preserve user-verification (PIN or
> biometric) requirement for resident keys loaded from a FIDO
> token, by checking the credential's credProtect policy.
> GHPR701 from Savely Krasovsky
>
> * ssh(1): include local and remote version strings in the ~I
> connection information display.
>
> * ssh-add(1): add a -P flag to skip PIN entry for FIDO and PKCS#11
> tokens that do not require it.
>
> * sftp(1): add '-p' flag for mkdir/lmkdir to create directories as
> required. This flag has similar ergonomics to mkdir(1), and
> previously-existing directories do not cause an error.
>
> * ssh-keygen(1): add a "hexdump" key export mode that dumps the SSH
> wire-formatted key blob in hex format. Useful when writing
> documentation, tests, etc. E.g. `ssh-keygen -em hexdump -f /key`
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): ChannelTimeout now accepts timeouts with
> fractional seconds.
>
> * sshd(8): allow specification of the location of $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
> used for agent forwarding using a new AgentSocketPath option.
> This supports both using a user-specific path, such as the
> default of a subdirectory of $HOME ("user:.ssh/agent"), and
> the previous approach of allowing agent forwarding sockets to be
> located in a shared directory (e.g. "shared:/tmp"). Sockets
> created in shared directories will be created inside a
> subdirectory with a randomised name. bz3860
>
> * ssh-agent(1): allow specification of agent socket directories
> using a -A flag. It accepts "user:" and "shared:" directory
> styles similar to the sshd AgentSocketPath option.
>
> * sshd(8): account for public key authentication "key ok" tests
> separately to auth attempts. Add a `PubkeyOptions max-pk-ok:nnnn`
> option to allow a number of PK_OK tests (asking whether the
> server might accept a given public key) that do not count against
> MaxAuthTries, defaulting to 6 attempts. After these attempts are
> exhausted, further attempts count as failed authentications
> against MaxAuthTries. Practically, this allows more keys on disk
> or held in ssh-agent to be checked for use before the server
> disconnects.
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): extend the existing TCPKeepAlive option to also
> support setting keepalives on sockets created for forwarding
> connections. Previously this option controlled keepalives on the
> connection socket only. TCPKeepAlive "yes" or "transport" enables
> keepalives on the connection socket. "TCPKeepAlive all" additionally
> enables them for forwarding sockets. bz3921
>
> Bugfixes
> --------
>
> * sshd(8), ssh(1): fix configuration matching on more Turkic
> languages which have disjoint dotted and dotless i/I characters,
> specifically Azerbaijani and Crimean Tatar. bz3991
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't attempt to set TCP_NODELAY on non-IP/IPv6
> sockets. Eliminates some noise in debug logs.
>
> * ssh(1): fix case for ssh -G option output; bz4005
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix ChannelTimeout specificity; previously a
> more specific channel type (e.g. "session:shell") could clobber
> a user-specified ChannelTimeout if it was less specific (e.g.
> "session"). Also, in some cases, the debug messages were
> printing 0 instead of the effective timeout. bz3994
>
> * sftp(1): avoid NULL dereference crash in some circumstances when
> a server fails a stat/lstat operation. GHPR707
>
> * sshd(8): close a race condition where a SIGTERM/SIGQUIT would be
> ignored if it was received by the server while it was processing a
> SIGHUP restart request. bz3981
>
> * sshd(8), ssh(1): check key and CA signature types during key
> parsing against allowlists (PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc) as
> early as possible. This reduces the attack surface presented by
> disabled algorithms. Suggested by and with extensive feedback
> from Chris Rohlf in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic
> Research.
>
> * All: switch the fallback implementation of the ed25519 signature
> algorithm used when libcrypto is disabled from SUPERCOP ed25519
> to libsodium. The libsodium implementation includes a number of
> strictness checks over the original reference implementation we
> have used to this point and a more ergonomic API.
>
> * ssh-add(1), ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix spin on password entry when
> the program attempting to read a password was started in a
> background process group, with no TTY and with certain signals
> ignored. bz3995
>
> * scp(1): disallow nul byte in received scp -O filename. This was
> not reachable in normal operation. Reported by Chua Wei Xun.
>
> * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): implement a maximum number of KDF
> rounds that will be accepted when writing an OpenSSH-format
> private key or when loading one. This limit is set quite high
> (1M), but ensures that a service that is passed a bad key with a
> ridiculously high number of rounds will eventually complete
> parsing it.
>
> * ssh-keygen(1): bump the default number of KDF rounds from 24 to
> 32 (this is a linear increase, not like bcrypt(3) which is
> exponential).
>
> * ssh(1): make StreamLocalBindMask properly respect Host/Match
> blocks and make it first-match-wins as documented. bz4013
>
> * sshd(8): make StreamLocalBindMask properly first-match-wins.
>
> Portability
> -----------
>
> * All: remove the NetBSD BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON workaround. This
> appears to be no longer required and caused pre-auth CPU spinning.
>
> * sshd(8): don't link sshd against libselinux when SELinux support
> is enabled (note: this library is still linked for the sshd-auth
> and sshd-session helper binaries).
>
> * sshd(8): allow madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED) in the seccomp
> sandbox; needed by GrapheneOS' hardened allocator. bz4001
>
> * sshd(8): restrict mremap(2) flags accepted by the seccomp
> sandbox. Only MREMAP_MAYMOVE is now accepted as other flags may
> have some utility in attack chains. Reported by: Mohammad Hossein
> Abedini.
>
> * sshd(8): allow PAMServiceName in Match (regressed in 10.4).
> During the refactor of server option parsing, the ability to set
> PAMServiceName in Match blocks was accidentally disabled.
>
> * sshd(8): the --disable-fd-passing configure option has been
> removed.
>
> Checksums:
> ==========
>
> - SHA1 (openssh-10.6.tar.gz) = 096e9cd60cd08e0acacfe16b615144f8c0463da5
> - SHA256 (openssh-10.6.tar.gz) = 0lP9h9/QH3k667vqbxKhkkusc3CN5iKUiDNI9fsR06A=
> - SHA1 (openssh-10.6p1.tar.gz) = e6a34f5625e20172b214c50ebd4e0dcb4fd18013
> - SHA256 (openssh-10.6p1.tar.gz) = qdyVZd/+hkD2TYY80poyvEo9vewFZqf8RMXW7nZ9Xzk=
>
> Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not
> hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP
> key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites:
> https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc
>
> Reporting Bugs:
> ===============
>
> - Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html
> Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh AT openssh DOT com
--
Jason Pyeron | Architect|CISSP-ISSAP
PD Inc | Certified SBA 8(a)
10 w 24th St | Certified SBA HUBZone
Baltimore, MD | CAGE Code: 1WVR6
.com: jpyeron AT pdinc DOT us
tel : 202-741-9397
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