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To: <cygwin AT cygwin DOT com>
References: <9392212be89f81f2 AT cvs DOT openbsd DOT org>
In-Reply-To: <9392212be89f81f2@cvs.openbsd.org>
Subject: RE: Announce: OpenSSH 10.6 released
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 08:33:28 -0400
Organization: PD Inc
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From: Jason Pyeron via Cygwin <cygwin AT cygwin DOT com>
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Cc: Jason Pyeron <jpyeron AT pdinc DOT us>
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I have uploaded this as a test-package.

Please test and let me know of bugs or successes.

v/r,

Jason

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Damien Miller
> Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2026 8:11 AM
> To: openssh-unix-dev AT mindrot DOT org
> Subject: Announce: OpenSSH 10.6 released
> 
> OpenSSH 10.6 has just been released. It will be available from the
> mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
> 
> OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
> includes sftp client and server support.
> 
> Recently the OpenSSH team have received a large number of security
> bug reports, many of which are findings from AI models or made with
> AI assistance. While many AI reports are determined not to have
> security impact when considered in the context of a realistic
> threat model, we very much welcome these reports, especially when
> combined with human triage, analysis, test-cases and particularly
> when accompanied by proposed fixes.
> 
> ** We have seen a number of cases where a security bug identified
> ** by AI tools is subsequently independently discovered by a
> ** different researcher. This suggests that adversaries who do not
> ** report bugs to OSS projects are likely to be able to discover
> ** these bugs too. Given this, the OpenSSH team will, for now, be
> ** making more frequent releases to get bugfixes into users' hands
> ** more quickly rather than batching them until the next planned
> ** release.
> 
> Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
> continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
> code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
> project. More information on donations may be found at:
> https://www.openssh.com/donations.html
> 
> Future deprecation notice
> -------------------------
> 
>  * scp(1): begin deprecating the -R flag, which is used to perform a
>    remote-to-remote copy by executing scp on a remote host. This
>    option is a fragile optimisation that is difficult to use because
>    it requires credentials on the remote host. It also creates
>    security risks if the shell quoting rules on the remote system
>    where the copy is performed differ from the client's expectations.
> 
>    From OpenSSH 10.6, this option will continue to work but will
>    cause a deprecation warning to be emitted to standard error. In
>    a future release, the option will be ignored and will leave in
>    place the default remote-to-remote copy behaviour (copy via the
>    host running scp).
> 
>  * sshd(8): support for platforms that do not allow file descriptor
>    passing and that also require root privilege for PTY allocation
>    will be removed in a future release. Affected platforms are known
>    to include SCO OpenServer 5 and QNX 6 but may include other
>    similarly old operating systems. This deprecation can be avoided
>    if the user community for these platforms is able to assist us in
>    building alternatives, such as avoiding the need for root in PTY
>    allocation.
> 
> Potentially-incompatible changes
> --------------------------------
> 
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): compression will be less effective as a result
>    of the change noted below in the "Security" section
> 
>  * ssh(1): destination usernames entered on the commandline are now
>    more stricly checked and will refuse usernames that include
>    backslash and dollar symbols. Usernames that are specified by
>    the "User" directive in configuration files are no subject to
>    these restrictions. This motivation for this change is mentioned
>    below in the "Security" section.
> 
>  * sshd(8): on platforms that do not support file descriptor passing
>    and that require root for PTY allocation, the GatewayPorts and
>    StreamLocalForwarding options are forcibly disabled. The
>    motivation for this changes is discussed below in the "Security"
>    section.
> 
> Changes since OpenSSH 10.5
> ==========================
> 
> This release contains a number of security fixes, several new
> features and some small bugfixes.
> 
> Security
> ========
> 
>  * sftp(1): more strictly validate paths returned from the server to
>    avoid some cases where a server could return paths that could
>    manipulate a recursive copy operation into writing outside its
>    target directory. Report and patch from Junghoon Cho.
> 
>  * sshd(8): when GSSAPIAuthentication is in use, only store GSSAPI
>    credentials when authentication has succeeded. Avoids a situation
>    where credentials from a failed GSSAPIAuthentication attempt may
>    persist and be made inappropriately available if another
>    authentication subsequently succeeds. Issue report and patch from
>    Moritz Theile.
> 
>  * sshd(8): reset GSSAPIAuthentication before authentication, avoiding
>    state from one authentication attempt being confused with that of
>    a later attempt. Report and feedback from Moritz Theile.
> 
>  * sshd(8), ssh(1): disable LZ77 dictionary coder to mitigate the
>    side-channel leaks described in "Crossing the Streams: SSH
>    Plaintext Recovery via a Common Compression Context in
>    Multiplexed Channels" by Fabian BC$umer and Marcus Brinkmann,
>    preprint https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07709 (2026)
> 
>    A chosen-plaintext attack method exists which makes use of
>    dictionary-based compression to recover secrets from one channel
>    by interacting with the SSH session's shared compression
>    dictionary through another channel.
> 
>    Attacker-controlled input can recognizably reflect into the
>    total length of transmitted ciphertexts by virtue of LZ77
>    replacing repeated strings with back-references into the SSH
>    session's encoder search buffer, which is shared across all
>    channels. For this reason, the documentation already recommended
>    against enabling compression for connections that share trusted
>    and untrusted traffic.
> 
>    This change will reduce the effectiveness of the Compression
>    option. Users are encouraged to use application-level compression
>    over the SSH protocol where possible, as this will typically be
>    more effective and will be completely immune to this type of
>    attack.
> 
>  * ssh(1): disallow '$' and '\' characters in usernames entered on
>    the command-line to avoid usernames from untrusted sources
>    yielding injection in shell context via ProxyCommand, Match exec,
>    etc. Usernames specified via the configuration files are not
>    subject this this control. Reported by SecBuddyF KeenLab Tencent
>    (CodeBuddy Security)
> 
>    We continue to recommend against directly exposing ssh(1) and
>    other tools' command-lines to untrusted input. Mitigations such
>    as this can not be absolute given the variety of shells and user
>    configurations in use.
> 
>  * ssh-keygen(1): correct handling of Daylight Saving Time when
>    converting dates. Previous handling could cause errors of
>    up to +/- 1 hour (unless you are in the Antarctica/Troll
>    timezone, where the error could be +/- 2 hours). These errors
>    could result in creation of certificates with incorrect expiry
>    times. bz4004; from Khush Patel
> 
>  * sshd(8), ssh(1): ensure that compressed payloads don't inflate
>    past the maximum supported packet length. Reported by Oleh Konko.
> 
>  * sshd(8): fully honor the authorized_keys "restrict" keyword,
>    which was not being properly applied to tunnel forwarding
>    (PermitTunnel, disabled by default). This is a separate problem
>    to the one fixed in openssh-10.5.
> 
>  * sshd(8): correctly handle some options that accept "none". Some
>    options, including AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, were documented as
>    accepting "none" as a way to disable them; however, when
>    overridden by an sshd_config(5) Match keyword, this argument was
>    being incorrectly interpreted as a literal file.
>    With Chris Rohlf in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research
> 
>  * sshd(8): On OS X SDK >= 27, sandboxing is no longer supported
>    as the API we depended upon has been removed and no obvious
>    alternative provided.
> 
>  * sshd(8): on platforms that do not support file descriptor passing
>    and that require root for PTY allocation, the post-authentication
>    sshd-session process retains root privilege, whereas on other
>    platforms this process runs with the privilege of the logged-in
>    user. When sshd-session was run with elevated privlege, it could
>    perform certain actions as root and circumvent controls that
>    would normally have applied to the user, such as making unix
>    domain socket connections or binding (via -R forwarding) to low-
>    numbered TCP ports.
> 
>    For this reason, this release disables the GatewayPorts and
>    StreamLocalForwarding options and support for these (few)
>    platforms will be removed in future if no alteratives to
>    requiring privilege in the post-authentication process are found.
>    Affected platforms include QNX 6, SCO OpenServer 5 and builds
>    that were made with the --disable-fd-passing configure option.
> 
>    This problem was reported separately by sn0x-sharma and by Dark
>    River.
> 
> New features
> ------------
> 
>  * All: enable hybrid post-quantum ssh-mldsa44-ed25519 signature
>    algorithm. Note that this no longer uses the "@openssh.com"
>    vendor extension suffix that the previous experimental
>    implementation used. Keys generated with the previous experimental
>    support must be regenerated and/or removed.
> 
>  * sshd(8): Add the WarnWeakCrypto option to sshd_config(5). This
>    option was previously available for the client only. This option
>    is enabled by default and will log when the client uses a key
>    agreement scheme that is not post-quantum safe.
> 
>  * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): preserve user-verification (PIN or
>    biometric) requirement for resident keys loaded from a FIDO
>    token, by checking the credential's credProtect policy.
>    GHPR701 from Savely Krasovsky
> 
>  * ssh(1): include local and remote version strings in the ~I
>    connection information display.
> 
>  * ssh-add(1): add a -P flag to skip PIN entry for FIDO and PKCS#11
>    tokens that do not require it.
> 
>  * sftp(1): add '-p' flag for mkdir/lmkdir to create directories as
>    required. This flag has similar ergonomics to mkdir(1), and
>    previously-existing directories do not cause an error.
> 
>  * ssh-keygen(1): add a "hexdump" key export mode that dumps the SSH
>    wire-formatted key blob in hex format. Useful when writing
>    documentation, tests, etc. E.g. `ssh-keygen -em hexdump -f /key`
> 
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): ChannelTimeout now accepts timeouts with
>    fractional seconds.
> 
>  * sshd(8): allow specification of the location of $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
>    used for agent forwarding using a new AgentSocketPath option.
>    This supports both using a user-specific path, such as the
>    default of a subdirectory of $HOME ("user:.ssh/agent"), and
>    the previous approach of allowing agent forwarding sockets to be
>    located in a shared directory (e.g. "shared:/tmp"). Sockets
>    created in shared directories will be created inside a
>    subdirectory with a randomised name. bz3860
> 
>  * ssh-agent(1): allow specification of agent socket directories
>    using a -A flag. It accepts "user:" and "shared:" directory
>    styles similar to the sshd AgentSocketPath option.
> 
>  * sshd(8): account for public key authentication "key ok" tests
>    separately to auth attempts. Add a `PubkeyOptions max-pk-ok:nnnn`
>    option to allow a number of PK_OK tests (asking whether the
>    server might accept a given public key) that do not count against
>    MaxAuthTries, defaulting to 6 attempts. After these attempts are
>    exhausted, further attempts count as failed authentications
>    against MaxAuthTries. Practically, this allows more keys on disk
>    or held in ssh-agent to be checked for use before the server
>    disconnects.
> 
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): extend the existing TCPKeepAlive option to also
>    support setting keepalives on sockets created for forwarding
>    connections. Previously this option controlled keepalives on the
>    connection socket only. TCPKeepAlive "yes" or "transport" enables
>    keepalives on the connection socket. "TCPKeepAlive all" additionally
>    enables them for forwarding sockets. bz3921
> 
> Bugfixes
> --------
> 
>  * sshd(8), ssh(1): fix configuration matching on more Turkic
>    languages which have disjoint dotted and dotless i/I characters,
>    specifically Azerbaijani and Crimean Tatar. bz3991
> 
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't attempt to set TCP_NODELAY on non-IP/IPv6
>    sockets. Eliminates some noise in debug logs.
> 
>  * ssh(1): fix case for ssh -G option output; bz4005
> 
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix ChannelTimeout specificity; previously a
>    more specific channel type (e.g. "session:shell") could clobber
>    a user-specified ChannelTimeout if it was less specific (e.g.
>    "session").  Also, in some cases, the debug messages were
>    printing 0 instead of the effective timeout. bz3994
> 
>  * sftp(1): avoid NULL dereference crash in some circumstances when
>    a server fails a stat/lstat operation. GHPR707
> 
>  * sshd(8): close a race condition where a SIGTERM/SIGQUIT would be
>    ignored if it was received by the server while it was processing a
>    SIGHUP restart request. bz3981
> 
>  * sshd(8), ssh(1): check key and CA signature types during key
>    parsing against allowlists (PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc) as
>    early as possible. This reduces the attack surface presented by
>    disabled algorithms. Suggested by and with extensive feedback
>    from Chris Rohlf in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic
>    Research.
> 
>  * All: switch the fallback implementation of the ed25519 signature
>    algorithm used when libcrypto is disabled from SUPERCOP ed25519
>    to libsodium. The libsodium implementation includes a number of
>    strictness checks over the original reference implementation we
>    have used to this point and a more ergonomic API.
> 
>  * ssh-add(1), ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix spin on password entry when
>    the program attempting to read a password was started in a
>    background process group, with no TTY and with certain signals
>    ignored. bz3995
> 
>  * scp(1): disallow nul byte in received scp -O filename. This was
>    not reachable in normal operation. Reported by Chua Wei Xun.
> 
>  * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): implement a maximum number of KDF
>    rounds that will be accepted when writing an OpenSSH-format
>    private key or when loading one. This limit is set quite high
>    (1M), but ensures that a service that is passed a bad key with a
>    ridiculously high number of rounds will eventually complete
>    parsing it.
> 
>  * ssh-keygen(1): bump the default number of KDF rounds from 24 to
>    32 (this is a linear increase, not like bcrypt(3) which is
>    exponential).
> 
>  * ssh(1): make StreamLocalBindMask properly respect Host/Match
>    blocks and make it first-match-wins as documented. bz4013
> 
>  * sshd(8): make StreamLocalBindMask properly first-match-wins.
> 
> Portability
> -----------
> 
>  * All: remove the NetBSD BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON workaround. This
>    appears to be no longer required and caused pre-auth CPU spinning.
> 
>  * sshd(8): don't link sshd against libselinux when SELinux support
>    is enabled (note: this library is still linked for the sshd-auth
>    and sshd-session helper binaries).
> 
>  * sshd(8): allow madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED) in the seccomp
>    sandbox; needed by GrapheneOS' hardened allocator. bz4001
> 
>  * sshd(8): restrict mremap(2) flags accepted by the seccomp
>    sandbox. Only MREMAP_MAYMOVE is now accepted as other flags may
>    have some utility in attack chains. Reported by: Mohammad Hossein
>    Abedini.
> 
>  * sshd(8): allow PAMServiceName in Match (regressed in 10.4).
>    During the refactor of server option parsing, the ability to set
>    PAMServiceName in Match blocks was accidentally disabled.
> 
>  * sshd(8): the --disable-fd-passing configure option has been
>    removed.
> 
> Checksums:
> ==========
> 
>  - SHA1 (openssh-10.6.tar.gz) = 096e9cd60cd08e0acacfe16b615144f8c0463da5
>  - SHA256 (openssh-10.6.tar.gz) = 0lP9h9/QH3k667vqbxKhkkusc3CN5iKUiDNI9fsR06A=
>  - SHA1 (openssh-10.6p1.tar.gz) = e6a34f5625e20172b214c50ebd4e0dcb4fd18013
>  - SHA256 (openssh-10.6p1.tar.gz) = qdyVZd/+hkD2TYY80poyvEo9vewFZqf8RMXW7nZ9Xzk=
> 
> Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not
> hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP
> key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites:
> https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc
> 
> Reporting Bugs:
> ===============
> 
> - Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html
>   Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh AT openssh DOT com

--
Jason Pyeron  | Architect|CISSP-ISSAP
PD Inc        | Certified SBA 8(a)
10 w 24th St  | Certified SBA HUBZone
Baltimore, MD | CAGE Code: 1WVR6
 
.com: jpyeron AT pdinc DOT us
tel : 202-741-9397


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