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Mail Archives: cygwin/2002/09/12/02:49:29

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Subject: Re: Beginnings of a patch: /etc/hosts
From: Robert Collins <rbcollins AT cygwin DOT com>
To: cygwin AT cygwin DOT com
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Date: 12 Sep 2002 16:49:41 +1000
Message-Id: <1031813381.22459.132.camel@lifelesswks>
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On Thu, 2002-09-12 at 10:10, Igor Pechtchanski wrote:

> > Rule #1: The user knows better than the tool. If the user wants to fool
> > the script, they can, even with uname. If a user is doing that, assume
> > they have a reason and let them do it with grace.
> >
> > Rob
>=20
> True.  Hey, I'm a control freak myself...  I was not speaking against
> "fooling the script", I was just making an observation.  However, the
> issue here is not the intentional "fooling" that you describe, but
> unintentional.  It's much harder to do that with 'uname -s' than with an
> environment variable.

Ok, I mis-interpreted your intention.
=20
> Besides, why would anyone want to fool a post-install script?
> Mmm, I guess I could think of a few reasons, but then shouldn't all
> post-install scripts be susceptible to fooling in the same way, i.e.,
> "with grace"?  Should this be documented somewhere?

I wasn't suggesting they *should* or *should not* be foolable. I was
really trying to say that the design should not be based on whether or
not a user can *intentionally* override something - because one way or
another the user can. The design should be whatever is:
* easy to maintain
* robust in the face of usual and common-unusual conditions.

Rob

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